

A Controversy Revisited

A Look at the Parallels in the Creation of the
United Reform Church and the United Church of
Christ

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The creation of the United Reform Church on May 11, 1971 brought to a close a time of sweeping change in the way that Congregationalism perceived itself as a movement, both theologically and most certainly administratively. The wave had begun in the United States almost thirty years prior when the Congregational Christian Churches first began to dialogue with the American Evangelical and Reformed Churches regarding the possibility of unification into one corporate body. Years of controversy marked those proceedings, until finally in 1957 the unification of the boards of these two denominations took place. A constitution for the eventual body, the United Church of Christ was drawn up and adopted in 1961. This made the organization of the church body an accomplished, although a number of churches refused to enter into the voluntary agreement linking themselves to it or to vote whether or not to join it at all.

Among those who saw the creation of this new, merged body was one Edward Wilcox of Leith, England. During some of the most heated discussions Mr. Wilcox records:

"My only hope is that the mother of this group, (English Congregationalism) does not take part in any folly as grand as this."⁽¹⁾

Unfortunately what Mr. Wilcox did not know was that ideas were also being passed around amongst the leadership of the English Congregationalists. Where did these ideas originate from? were they drawn out from the background under which these leaders operated or were these leaders influenced to a great deal by the arguments and outlook of their brothers who were trying to transform Congregationalism into something quite different from its origin. Why are there so many parallels in the institution, construction and consummation of the creation of the merged church body that is known as the United Reform Church? Is this the way all discussions and debates regarding church bodies play themselves out or did each party in the debates and discussions take their cues from the controversy just past in American Congregationalism? These are the questions that are to be the subject of this paper.

The then Congregational Union of England and Wales (C.U.E.W.) began the year 1960 with a vision to improve themselves as a denomination and fellowshiping body. Twelve years later what was left of the Congregational Union destroyed itself and merged with the Presbyterian Church of England to form the United Reform Church. Their self study had led them away from the concept that they had created themselves around, historic independency, and so now the autonomy of the local church under Christ's authority was surrendered for a belief in a more expedient centrally governed and connectionally administered denomination. However, some made their voices known in the struggle against the union and the events that led up to it. It was they that founded the Congregational Federation, similar to our National Association, in opposition to the URC.²

The Congregational Union began its self examination under the direct call of the Congregational Assembly of 1959 in Manchester. The board of the Congregational Union appointed several commissions to consider and report on the practices and policies of administration, the nature of the ministry, the conduct of worship and the nature of the faith that was commonly adhered to by most Congregationalists.

The first was Commission I, which became the most well known since it was given as its agenda the consideration of the existing framework for the C.U.E.W., at that time a voluntary association of churches, each maintaining its own autonomy. In the report that they drew up they expounded a need for a more formal, cohesive structure. They then advocated a kind of "oversight group" to enhance their vision of the "episcopate".

They, however, did not go so far as to support a church union, but instead to a theory of a "churchly body" which the autonomous churches could covenant with and be faithful to.³

The terms of "episcopate", "churchly body" and "covenant" were very undefined by the church report and this led to many questions and heated debates in trying to define terms that seemed at odds with the historic independency of the Congregational church. To assist in the process of clarification, the church boards began to assert themselves in the dialogues that were breaking out. Literature from the national offices tried desperately to find middle ground in the definition of terms, but to no avail.

As the debates became more and more heated two perspectives emerged. There were those who supported the motions outlined in the report of Commission I which in a sense called for the wholesale radical restructuring of Congregationalism as it was known. The others were more moderate in outlook. They too believed that a change in the system of governance was indeed necessary yet they staunchly refused any attempt to change which would undermine the very undergirding principles on which their faith was built.

The controversy simmered until October, 1961 when the General Secretary of the Congregational Assembly sent a memo to the churches. It stated to the effect that at the following May meetings a judgement should be made by the churches regarding a resolution of this kind:

"That a serious attempt be made to establish under God a churchly body, as described in the report of Commission I on a covenantal relationship.

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responsibility for the church's missionary obligation at home and abroad and therefore a body be appointed to prepare a draft constitution for such a body, such a draft to be presented and discussed at the Assembly of 1963 and voted on at the Assembly of 1964."⁴

The very fact that the time element for this type of proposal was ill advised, given the short amount of time that the congregations had for honest debate, sent off alarm bells among ministers and church members. A group of twenty one formed itself and petitioned the board of the General Assembly not to press for a decision on the commissions suggestions at the May meetings sine the church had so little time to consider them. From then on these original twenty-one would be known as the "anxious Congregationalists".⁵

After the petition of the twenty one was carried in the Manchester Herald there seemed to be an concerted effort on the part of those who supported Commission I's findings to try to reason with them. The supporters of Commission I stated that the argument lie with the unacceptable absence of a definition of authority. Many claimed that they to would disavow the commissions suggestions if they found them to be counter to the idea that Congregationalism be autonomous, yet they insisted that the restructuring would provide better ways for the association to work for the Kingdom.

Among the most fiercely opposed sections of the report was one that identified the concept of a local church meeting with that of the huge General Assembly meetings. In that characterization the fears were rose that an assemblies decision could override one that was made by a local congregation. ⁶

Nevertheless, a form of then resolution was made on the floor of the Assembly to its members as was this".

"After assessing the needs and direction of the association at this time, we hee assembled to agree that a serious attempt be made by all parties to implement all the motions and findings of the Report of Commission I."⁷

The assembled delegates immediately broke into one of two camps, ones that did not see any need to modify the resolution that had been brought before them and those who wanted to greatly modify the wording, and the timetable, to be more acceptable to the congregations at large. Those who wished to modify the proposal held sway with their size and after only lively debate the clause was modified:

"...That a serious attempt be made by all the parties to work out the implications of all the motions and findings of the Report of Commission I."⁸

So, there were a few who had serious reservations still that the "Implications" would indeed be "worked out" and the plan still implemented without their consent.

Discussion and debate raged hot and heavy in the large parishes and the small kirks alike. So much so that in the Spring of !963 the "anxious Congregationalists" again struck by petitioning the General Purpose Committee of the General Assembly that inadequate opportunity was given to consider

the issues and time given to the opponents of Commission I to express rebuttal opinions. Unfortunately, the committee put aside this argument insisting that it had no jurisdiction to make the matter a part of the forthcoming agenda, although it may be brought forward for review under the "New Business" section of the meeting. However, with the committee unbalanced to favoring the report of Commission I the "Anxious Congregationalists" never again explored this channel.⁹

By May, 1963 a draft constitution was prepared and if the Assembly wished to take action upon it ready to be sent to the churches for their criticism and consideration. An amendment was made by members of the building coalition of dissenters to Commission I that an appendix be included containing divergent opinions regarding the main text. Such was the case with the report regarding Anglican-Methodist relations considered by the respective denominations a few years earlier, why could it not be so now the question was stated. The Assembly remained in deadlock over this question for several hours, neither side holding sway enough to force a vote. Finally the supporters of Commission I convinced the chair of the meeting and certain deputies that the appendix would only confuse the congregations as they deliberated. Therefore debate was suspended and a vote taken immediately, while, I may add, the dissenters were on a break away from the floor. The appendix amendment was defeated unanimously thus assuring to those who supported the report of Commission I the sole ability to present its case to the rest of the churches.¹⁰

The dissenters were in an uproar. Their position had been crushed by manipulations so they deemed it necessary to retaliate. They did so in the pamphlet "Six Reasons Why The Draft Constitution is Not Acceptable!".¹¹ Prepared and circulated at the dissenters own expense it took the mere war of words and theological positions into a new arena that of open bitter conflict. In itself the leaflet brought with it mixed results. There was open acknowledgement of fears that had been held for a long time, anger that a minority would dare chastise the leadership of the national church body and final proof of the intractability that the situation had now grown into..

In May, 1964 the following resolution passed resoundingly:

"In light of resolutions and comments received from the churches, the Assembly commends to the churches the principal of a covenanted fellowship as a basis for a national body."¹²

the final vote was 1651 for and 49 against. Again the vote was taken with a minimum of discussion and so early in the opening session that a vast majority of the dissenters were not even present to cast their ballot. However, it was postponed until the meetings of 1965 as to whether the draft constitution was acceptable or not. Yet in all the calamity that befell the dissenters at the 1964 meetings there was also a bond that formed between them. Due to this new bonding of the dissenters, they decided to take the name of the Congregatioanl Association. They also elected leaders who were:

John B. Wilcox, a mechanical engineer as Secretary
 Norman G.M. Pitchard (Later Sir Norman) Treasurer
 R.W. Cleaves Chairman¹³

These men led the discussions on if to continue to fight the commissions report or to abdicate to the national association. The vote was to continue to fight.

In May, 1965 the proposition was made to the Assembly that

"The name of the new body shall called the Congregational Church of England and Wales."¹⁴ though the Congregational Union was so large that one would never mistake it for a church nor its meetings never resembling a local congregational church meeting, in one sentence the face of English Congregationalism was rewritten forever. The proposition passed overwhelmingly.

In May, 1966 came the next victory for the supporters of Commission I. The constitution was adopted by a wide margin. Most of the dissenters stayed home in hopes of breaking the quorum necessary to have a binding vote. The strategy did not succeed as pro-commission people were allowed to take their seats.¹⁵

Yet the first clear schism erupted over the press to reform. The Conservative Evangelical Church, a backbone of support for many years, decided that the conduct of the pro-commission forces to this point had been shameful and in retaliation they split on an overwhelming vote from the new Congregational Church of England and Wales, never to return. These churches also refused to take part in the covenantal voting carried on later, however it is interesting that most are considered to have joined the C.C.E.W. and henceforth the U.R.C. although no voting records can substantiate this idea.¹⁶

Other churches did not feel it wise to reply negatively and they chose not to reply at all and yet they too were viewed by the new C.C.E.W. as having covenanted without ever having signed the covenant.

This left the Congregational Church of England and Wales open to pursue other interests, one of them being the continuing mergers with other church bodies that had become a part of their history. Among the denominations that they began to talk with were the Presbyterian Church of England, a much smaller but quite powerful group in England.

These discussions first were known in November 1965 when this lead article was published in the Congregational Church's paper THE OBSERVER by Cecil Northcott. It read:

"A plan for formation of a United Free Church of England is being considered by 2500 Congregational and 300 Presbyterian Churches...The headquarters of both churches are strongly backing the scheme."¹⁷

This announcement there was a discernible shift in the debates on questions of authority of the new congregational body towards questions of unity. The popular mind was bombarded with literature that extolled the virtues of a unified church and falsely categorized those who would oppose these talks as against unity, unwilling to change, to set in the past glory of the church, and non - realists. There was also change among the dissenting group as they switched from debating the effectiveness of the new denomination to debating the issues regarding the merger talks. The issues between the two had a largely familiar perspective but the merger issues were the more complex. The issues were for the dissenters these:

- (a.) The covenanting process to form the C.C.E.W., many churches had deferred a decision on the matter and were in the process of consulting the Congregational Association for a balanced view of the choices at stake
- (b.) The scheme of Union between the C.C.E.W. and the Presbyterian Church of England with a view to establish the United Reform Church.
- (c.) Christian Unity, for which there was complete unanimity on both sides, though marked divisions of opinion on both the nature of the unity desired and the means of attaining it.¹⁸

The issues were spoken directly to the churches in the Congregational Manifesto that was published in February, 1967. Finally the dissenters had gotten together long enough to hammer out a cogent, logical and above all consistent position on each of these issues. Regarding the process of covenanting the dissenters rebuked a process that would use a single vote to spell out the position of a single church once and for all, as had been the case up to this point. This coupled with the verified voting results that most churches had been voting in favor of the covenant but with less than the three quarters of the votes cast to place the church on the denominational roles. They also found repugnant the fact that churches only voted with the three quarters majority after leaders of the denomination had been there to coerce them with the fact that if they did not vote accordingly they would be cut off from assistance from their governing boards, deprived of ministerial assistance and for the ministers, their pension funds would be severed.¹⁹

Regarding the scheme of Union being proposed the dissenters realized quite early that the negotiators for the Congregational Church were using as a bargaining chip the possible subsuming of the historic independence on which Congregationalism was built and replacing it with an entirely presbyterian structure in order to induce the Presbyterians into the merger. This single issue drew the most outrage in the Manifesto. Historic Independency had always been their way and now in the look toward being "expedient" the death knell was sounded.

Finally the entire debate over the need to have one overarching unified church went to the forefront of discussion everywhere in Great Britain. Those who favored such a compact believed that in an era of multi-national corporations the best way to use the resources given to it the church must consent to being streamlined in this way. The dissenters raised the idea of the cost to be payed in rewritten history to preform such a streamlining. Two valid and contrasting points of view.

However, the debates did not prevent the introduction of the scheme of Unity from being introduced to the full Assembly in May, 1968 for the first time. From just its first reading tempers were already going to run white hot with charges and counter charges. The clauses of the scheme that drew the strongest dissent were:

- (a.) The General Assembly would under the plan consist of representatives from district councils and the number of ministers and church members would be severely cut making the assembly a professional oversight group.

(b.) In the event of a dispute between a local church and the national body the local church must appeal first to the district council for redress, then to the provincial synod then to General Assembly.

(c.) The decision of General Assembly on any matter before it will be considered final and binding

(d.) Even on matters of faith and doctrine the General Assembly has power to:

"Alter, add to, modify, or supersede the Basis, Structure, and any form or expression of the polity or doctrinal formulations of the U.R.C."

(e.) Before the local church may appoint deacons the national body will elect elders for life. These elders would not necessarily serve at the same time but be so designated. This would create a dual grade of church membership.

(f.) In the absence of ordained clergy to preside over the sacraments only such lay members of the church which are duly authorized, such as elders, may do so.

(g.) A local church may call a minister with the concurrence of the district councils yet the district councils may withhold their concurrence in calls to ministers for whatever reason deemed appropriate.

(h.) All property of the local church henceforth becomes a part of the U.R.C.²⁰

These were hotly debated issues but the dissenters were clearly dealt a fatal blow when the commission assignments to criticize the scheme were announced. Every commission was heavily weighted to the pro-scheme side and some commissions did not have a single dissenting voice as one of its members.

Therefore, it was of no surprise to anyone that in January of 1965, after less than eight months of debate by the churches, a Declaration of Intent was made to accept the scheme of Union with no substantive changes. Now the heat of the decisions was turned up and many churches were strong armed into believing that to go against the flow towards merger now would only affect their isolation and loss of board funding, so they acquiesced

Knowing that they faced a very long road alone if they could not shore up their associations with each other. The Congregational Association held a break away meeting in May 1969 at Caxton Hall with the scholar Dr. R. Tudor Jones as keynote speaker. They came away believing that they could indeed keep the light of Congregationalism burning even if the majority wished to consent to the merger. This became a key test of willingness for what was to come.

In February of 1970 the supporters of the merger plan affected the introduction of a bill into Parliament to authorize the use of various trusts, formerly under the control of the Congregational Church and the Presbyterian Church respectively, for the creation of the United Reform Church. The supporters felt that they were at liberty to move quickly in these terms and did not expect much in the way of opposition in the House of Commons or Lords. However, they did not expect the fire that was generated by Sir Norman Pritchard, once the treasurer of the "anxious Congregationalists" and now member of the House of Lords and by Lady Eldwina Strangate, whose husband Edward was a very influential member of The House of Lords. Both Sir

Norman and Edward led the forces which were forming and formenting in the parliment for years and spearheaded the filibuster for a clause to be inserted in the original scheme and the declaration of intent. The clause read:

"...And in respect to those of our fellowship who wish to move in other directions we do so agree to an equitable division of the properties, lands and monies that are accrued...."21

The clause passed on its second reading by a close vote of 127 to 123 in the House of Commons yet in the House of Lords, where support for the dissenters opinions were surprisely great, the vote was nearly unanimous

The apportionment of the assets was then left up to the Charity Commission, who's agenda from its inception had always been to control the disbursements of government monies to not for profit, church and charitable organizations. The members and advisors when necessary were supposed to exempt themselves from discussion and voting on disbursements that would directly effect or profit them. Yet it was found early on in the discussions that members and advisors who were avowedly pro-union were pushing the commission in a direction against the dissenters and refusing the dissenters a chance to present their own case. When this was brought before the Parliment for redress. The commission did a thorough housecleaning and removed all members and advisors from their posts if they had participated in the debates up to that point, which insured that non-partiality would be preserved and justice done.²²

Another clause that was pushed for debate was the one that made the vote of the churches final and binding. This clause was never explained properly to the rural congregations, who thought that they were taking an advisory vote only. Due to this miscommunication, large numbers of small congregations were ushered into the union without ever knowing what the clause implied. The debates were also motivated by Sir Norman. Yet on this point the pro-union forces were able to muster the votes to defeat the bill on its first and second readings and the House of Lords did not wish to take up the idea with a debate.

On May 11, 1971 The Congregational Assembly met in Westminster Abbey, London and after conducting its usual housekeeping agenda of items its full attention was directed to the debate, and as the supporters hoped, ratification of their scheme of Union. The debate was slated to last from 4:30 to 7:30 p.m. yet there were several breeches of order and conduct during the meeting which put in doubt its impartialness or validity. These were:

- The rules regarding those who wished to speak before the floor was revised. Under normal circumstances the person wishing to speak submitted his name prior to the meeting, irregardless of position, and it was included in the agenda. An equal number of people representing both sides was also sought and speaking was limited to fifteen minutes a person. These were abolished for this debate with an informal sign-up sheet, passed out just moments before the debate started to members favoring union only. These were

brought to the secretaries desk, accepted as valid

and they were therefore the only group with official recognition from the meeting chair to speak on the floor. This effectively eliminated any dissenting voices from being heard.

- Speakers were only allowed five minutes rather than fifteen minutes to speak in the name of speeding up the process. This imposed limit was exceeded many times by the pro-union speakers.
- Finally, to the absolute surprise of the non-union delegates, the debate was hastily closed by a motion from the balcony area at 6:45 p.m., a full forty-five minutes before necessary. This was quickly voted in the affirmative and when cries went up from non-union delegates of subterfuge of the meeting process, was upheld by the chair who believed it to be " in the best interests of the assembled delegates." ²³

The vote was almost anticlimactic. The scheme was resoundingly approved by an 89% margin. (79% at Leicester were the Presbyterians were meeting in session concurrently). After this was accomplished, denominational officials resolved to anywhere in the country to advocate for the scheme and to expropriate Congregational funds for the purpose. The Congregational Union, however, had to raise its own funds(or hope for donations) in order to travel and present the case against the scheme. ²⁴

The debate was now on. Church special meetings were held and the contrasting opinions heard. Then came the votes,

at times held in validity and at others manipulated one or the other. Several times, though, there had to be several such voting times for the church to achieve anything close to the three quarter majority necessary by law in the scheme to consider the vote a valid reflection of the church's stance on the matter.

On January 15, 1972 the official tabulation by the national office was made public. Of the 2,265 Congregational Churches and 302 Presbyterian Churches approached with the union proposal, 1668 Congregational and 300 Presbyterian Churches had accepted the Union scheme. This left 597 Congregational and 2 Presbyterian churches outside the Union. Yet there were 700 or more Congregational churches which did not participate in the vote since they had decided to remain neutral in the dispute. Therefore the three quarter majority necessary to implement the plan was not established.²⁵

The dissenters were overjoyed. Now they needed to know those churches which had voted against the merger to begin to establish some associative ties with them. This information was kept under wraps by the central office for a long time, however, in order for the national leaders to begin a movement to strong arm the dissenting churches in voting again, this time for the union. Threats of withdrawal of financial support were almost too much for the smaller churches to bear. However, it was Lady Strangate who saved the association by threatening a protracted Parliamentary battle over the distribution of assets of the Congregational Church. This threat served as sufficient motivation for the national congregational body to release the figures regarding the dissenting churches and the Congregational Union now grew in strength.²⁶

This led the dispute to October 10, 1972 the date when the United reform Church officially was recognized with a celebration at Westminster Abbey attended by many officials and members of government. Four days later though a much smaller meeting was held in those walls. The 141st Convocation and Assembly of the Congregational Union The split was now complete albeit intense and messy. It also left a bitter taste in the mouths of congregationalists for years to come.²⁷

Where then are the comparisons between this rather bellicose and snide controversy in English Congregationalism and the rapacious conflict that we suffered through in the late fifties and early sixties. One need not look far for similarities.

Both conflicts started shortly after reports were filed regarding an assessment of the structure of the denomination at that time. I do not wish to imply that assessments of denominational structures should not be made from time to time, however, these reports are usually written in undefined terminology, with inherent vagueness as a result. Therefore, the conflict falls squarely on the shoulders of the parties to the report, usually contrasting in style and direction and motivated by charismatic personalities. Stephen Ware Bailey identifies Douglas Horton as such in his paper revolving around the American Congregational conflict. As Horton is there so is Sir John Northampton and, unbelievably, Edward Wilcox whom I quoted earlier. These two paired against Lady Stransgate and Sir Norman Pritchard make a volatile situation at best. Therefore two sides emerge which are intractable and refuse to let the other gain the upper hand.

The process moves then from the private discussion to the open public forums, first in denominational literature then onward to newspapers, magazines and television. It is there that the debate degenerates from exchange of ideas to acrimonious accusation.

Another area of comparison revolves around the politics that were engaged in by both sides in pursuit of their own specific agendas. The English participants seemed to have borrowed much in the way of the use of threats and strong arm tactics in furthering the union idea. The union supporters ability to manipulate the rules of order and procedures for meetings so as to exclude the participation of non-supporters in any of the decision-making of the denomination in quite extraordinary. Even by American standards in the conflict that we engaged in regarding some the same issues, I cannot recall an instance of a meeting where the pro-merger supporters were able to gain sole recognition of the chair of a meeting as important as the debate on the merger itself in order to prevent the dissenting faction from speaking its opinions such as the pro-union faction did at Westminster Abbey in 1971.

Also, and this is a large departure from the debate in the United States, there was important battles being fought in the Parliament at the same time as in the churches. In my estimation this was probably the more important battle ground in the controversy. It was also here that the dissenting faction in the Congregational Union carried more weight and respect.

Due to this, there came the great difference in the outcome of the merger/union controversies. While, as most know due to the overturning of the judgement in the Cadman case by Judge Steinbrink, the dissenting faction who formed the Congregational Christian Church/National Association did not receive any sort of monetary settlement from the vast accrued assests of the General Council. However, The Congregational Church of England and Wales Wales was not so lucky. Since the union scheme had to be approved by Parliment, the dissenters were able to push through a revision of a crucial clause and guaranteed themselves of a financial windfall in excess of 60 million dollars which was apportioned to them by the Commission on Charities, as their legal inheritance of the resources as a "dissenting faction" to the union scheme.

Therefore, the lack of interference by the government in the affairs of the church insured a bitterness that persist in some of our dealings with the United Church of Christ. while government approval of the union which created the United Reform Church insured proper treatment of dissenting factions and fair apportionment of assets.

Another comparison can be made regarding voting proceedures, requirements and aftermaths. Both the merger in the United States and the Union scheme in Great Britain relied on voting done at the local parish level after the presentation, by both sides, of the facts as they saw them. These church meetings called for this purpose were generally well attended as a whole.

Yet the supporters of the merger/union made one crucial error in their thinking. Believing themselves as having almost an air tight case for union/merger, foolishly believed that they could summons overwhelming majorities of votes in each church. So they agreed to an almost impossible assessment that three quarters of the membership must vote for or against the merger/union schemes for the election to be held as a valid representation of the will of the members of that church.

First, there were more than several churches who could not muster the needed numbers for a valid vote. Even when the numbers were there though the membership was to split to give the merger/union supporters the majority that they needed. Finally, this standard became an anachronism, being applied when necessity or threat forced the issue and not as a general rule. Along with this was the idea of insisting that the 700 plus churches (450-500 in the States) which had not voted at all be counted as if they had voted in favor of the merger. This was contested in the United States and the idea was rescinded before implementation yet in England there are churches regarded as part of the union which consider themselves as not a part of it and worship according to their, and not URC, methods and procedures.

In the final analysis, the controversy that Edward Wilcox wanted to keep so desperately from affecting the English Congregationalism that he loved happened. Happened in such a fashion as to almost mirror, and in some cases supercede, its American counterpart. It produced acrimony and suspicion.

It produced two streams of thought on further attempts to organize any type of ecclesiastical merger, one which would always press for the "One Great Church" that Paul had envisioned. The other one would ask and continues to do so "But at what cost? Do we really have to destroy the old ways continuously in order to evolve as an institution? And even if we unite at the top does that guarantee that those whom we shepard will follow?"

Above all it produced the end of an era when man finally realized that a total ecumenical existance would not, could not work. Man and institution realized that the differences of opinion, of race, of creed, of economic class would always be there. They could not be simply erased and replaced by something that was contrived or created to lessen the differences. In this, maybe, is perfected the greatest gift of a controversy revisited.

FootNotes

- 1 Arthur Peel, A Brief History of English Congegationalism
p. 17
- 2 R.W. Cleaves, Congregationalism 1960-1976 p.7.
- 3 Ibid., p12.
- 4 Douglas Horton, Congregationalism: A Study in Church
Polity, p. 23.
- 5 Cleaves, Op.Cit. p. 27.
- 6 Horton, Op. Cit. p. 21.
- 7 Ibid., p 25.
- 8 Ibid., p 29.
- 9 Peel, Op. Cit. p 34.
- 10 Arthur Rouner The Congregational Way of Life p 28.
- 11 Cleaves, Op. Cit. p 40.
- 12 Ibid., p 45.
- 13 Daniel Jenkins Congregationalism p 58.
- 14 Cleaves, Op. Cit. p 56.
- 15 Ibid., p 60.
- 16 Peel, Op. Cit. p 54
- 17 Cleaves, Op. Cit. p 3.
- 18 Peel, Op. Cit. p 62.
- 19 Cleaves, Op. Cit. p 68.
- 20 Horton, Op. Cit. p 86.
- 21 Cleaves, Op. Cit. p 78.

22 Ibid., p 81

23 Horton, Op. Cit. p 97.

24 Cleaves, Op. Cit. p 101

25 Horton, Op. Cit. p 107

26 Ibid., p 112.

27 Cleaves, Op. Cit. p 125.

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